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The League of Nations, Ethiopia and the making of states 
Megan Donaldson* 
I. Ethiopia as a lens on statehood and state-making 
In the late nineteenth century, Abyssinia, though nominally recognized as an independent state, 
remained on the fringes of the international legal order. From 1906, it was the subject of a 
“Tripartite Agreement” in which Britain, France and Italy, the three European powers controlling 
surrounding territory, undertook to preserve the integrity of Abyssinia—yet reserved their 
respective interests against a future in which the country might collapse.1 During World War I, 
Italian, and even some British, officials anticipated bringing Abyssinia under protectorate,2 and 
Britain and Italy agreed in 1919 not to entertain any proposals for League membership.3 Even 
American planners, with no direct imperial interest at stake, took it for granted that “Abyssinia has 
no place in” the future League. These planners assumed a handful of other polities would be 
excluded on the basis of their small size or lack of independence, but Abyssinia, alone of the 
candidates then under discussion, was self-evidently disbarred. 4  Yet in 1923, to “prolonged 
applause” in the League Assembly, Abyssinia was admitted as a member of the League by a 
unanimous vote.5 This admission was perceived by contemporaries as a startling expansion, and 
flattening, of a Eurocentric, hierarchical “family of nations.” Indeed the British Foreign Secretary 
																																																								
* With thanks to Nehal Bhuta, Guy Fiti Sinclair, and other participants in the workshop for comments on 
an initial draft; and to colleagues in the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, together with Duncan 
Bell, Maja Spanu, Stephen Wertheim, and Natasha Wheatley, for valuable discussions thereafter.  
Note on terminology, translation, spelling, sources: I here use ‘Ethiopia’ as the term which was 
preferred by the Ethiopian government in the twentieth century. Unless otherwise spccified, translations 
from French are my own. Spelling of Ethiopian names, titles and places generally follows secondary 
literature. Abbreviations of sources: FO ((UK) Foreign Office files in National Archives, Kew); LNA 
(League of Nations Secretariat Archives); LNOJ (League of Nations Official Journal, with ‘SS’ denoting 
Special Supplement thereto); LNTS (League of Nations Treaty Series); MAE ((France) Ministère des 
Affaires étrangères); PAAP (Papiers d’agents et archives privées). 
1 Agreement between the United Kingdom, France, and Italy respecting Abyssinia, signed at London, 
December 13, 1906 [Cmd 3298], art 1(a). See Edward C Keefer, “Great Britain, France and the Ethiopian 
Tripartite Treaty of 1906,” Albion 13, no. 4 (1981): 364–80. 
2 Robert L Hess, “Italy and Africa: Colonial Ambitions in the First World War,” Journal of African 
History 4, no. 1 (1963): 105–126; Peter J Yearwood, “Great Britain and the Repartition of Africa, 1914-
19,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 18 (2008): 316. 
3 Harold G Marcus, Haile Sellassie I: The Formative Years (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1987), 43–45. 
4 Scott/Miller skeleton draft of the peace treaty in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United 
States 1919: The Paris Peace Conference, vol. I (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1942), 
298, 314. 
5 LNOJSS 13 (1923): 125. 
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fretted privately that “if Abyssinia is admitted there will be no future ground for excluding 
anybody.”6  
This article takes the Ethiopian case as a lens on how the existence of the League refracted 
approaches to statehood and belonging for polities on the margins of the “family of nations.” 
Unlike many other doctrinal or historical treatments, this article does not focus on any one juridical 
concept or doctrine, such as sovereignty, statehood, or recognition. Rather, it traces the flux within 
concepts, and the uneasy relation between them, which come to light when public statements in 
the League are read alongside deliberations within European foreign ministries, and projects of 
reform pursued in Ethiopia itself. Refocusing on the complexity of contemporary discussions 
reveals how juridical approaches have shifted over time in their relation to concrete factors such 
as military force, bureaucratic organization and political structures, and bridges a distinction 
entrenched by disciplinary demarcations in the secondary literature on statehood and state-
making.7 
The interwar history of thinking about statehood—or the relations between people, territory and 
political authority more broadly—is admittedly complex and multifaceted. This was a period of 
profound intellectual contestation over the relationship between law and the state. 8  Peace 
settlements saw the construction of new political and territorial orders, grounded in sometimes-
conflicting logics of historic right, self-determination on national or ethnic affiliation, and 
plebiscitary democracy; but inflected too by the demands of power politics.9 Innovations under 
League auspices, from the crafting of mandates to new arrangements for territorial administration, 
suggested new and sometimes divergent avenues in thinking about sovereignty, statehood and rule. 
The League put existing tensions, between a world of “powers” ordered hierarchically and a 
renewed commitment to nominal sovereign equality,10 and between an abstract notion of the state 																																																								
6 Curzon to Cecil, 17 Sep 1923, FO 371/8410 [A 5519/5097/1].  
7 In legal terms, for example, Ethiopian statehood dates from the late nineteenth century, if not earlier, 
whereas some social scientific accounts suggest that state-making did not begin in earnest until after 
WWII, and may remain unfinished today: see, eg, Christopher S Clapham, Africa and the International 
System: The Politics of State Survival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 7–14; John 
Markakis, Ethiopia: The Last Two Frontiers (Boydell & Brewer, 2011), 14–17, 108; Alex de Waal, The 
Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business of Power (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2015), 155–73. 
8 See, eg, Jochen von Bernstorff, The Public International Law Theory of Hans Kelsen: Believing in 
Universal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
9 See, eg, Eric D Weitz, “From the Vienna to the Paris System: International Politics and the Entangled 
Histories of Human Rights, Forced Deportations, and Civilizing Missions,” American Historical Review 
113, no. 5 (2008): 1313–43; Tara Zahra, “The ‘Minority Problem’ and National Classification in the 
French and Czechoslovak Borderlands,” Contemporary European History 17, no. 2 (2008): 137–65; 
Volker Prott, The Politics of Self-Determination: Remaking Territories and National Identities in Europe, 
1917-1923 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Leonard V Smith, Sovereignty at the Paris Peace 
Conference of 1919 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). 
10 On the importance of the (great) “power.” as distinct from the “state,” as an actor in international 
society, Edward Keene, “The Naming of Powers,” Cooperation and Conflict 48, no. 2 (2013): 268–82. 
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and the realities of governance in empires, under new pressure. Nevertheless, the Ethiopian 
example does bring to light a distinct and important part of this larger picture.  
The Ethiopian case reveals the League of Nations “making” states in several different ways. Most 
obviously, the existence of the League created a need for formal criteria for membership. This 
forced new articulations of what it was to be a state worthy of full membership in the international 
legal order. Such articulations were shaped in turn by the way the League changed the modalities 
of interstate interaction. The League made possible proceduralized, often public, exchanges on a 
footing of notional equality, which helped amplify previously marginalized voices in the initial 
debates over admission. Beyond admission, the League offered avenues through which Ethiopia 
could assert its own formal status—ostensibly already secured—as a state equal to other members, 
but also a potential mechanism for collective or foreign oversight and intervention.  
In substantive terms, Becker Lorca has suggested that Ethiopian admission reflected an imperfect 
shift from a nineteenth-century “standard of civilization,” with strong cultural and religious 
dimensions, to a “more concrete” and ostensibly culturally neutral paradigm of “statehood.”11 At 
least superficially, this was a shift from Eurocentric criteria, applied most authoritatively by 
European powers and publicists, to facially objective criteria applicable by any observer. On the 
other hand, Parfitt questions the extent to which the League really broke with older cultural and 
racial hierarchies, emphasizing that Ethiopia’s admission was subject to special obligations which 
encoded, rather than transcended, inferiority.12 
Here, I suggest a distinct reading. I argue that the Ethiopian case shows not so much a coherent 
interwar reformulation of statehood as an absence of any formulation which interlocutors found 
wholly compelling. It shows that, precisely at the moment in which criteria for admission to a new 
institutional incarnation of the international community were being formalized, there was a curious 
absence in the League debates of explicit discussion about political authority, and what might 
crudely be called state capacity. Stated criteria on which applications for admission were examined 
assumed, but did not explicitly demand, many of the attributes which had loomed large in 
nineteenth-century discussions. Where European officials sought to think in principled terms, it 
was clear the formal criteria were not wholly capturing the conscious and unconscious assumptions 
about the nature of the state. The perceived lack of certain attributes in Ethiopia—and the 																																																								
Keene and Simpson converge in their emphasis on stratification and hierarchy alongside new legal 
instantiations of sovereign equality: Edward Keene, “The Standard of ‘Civilisation’, the Expansion Thesis 
and the 19th-Century International Social Space,” Millennium 42, no. 3 (2014): 651–73; Gerry Simpson, 
Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
11 Arnulf Becker Lorca, Mestizo International Law: A Global Intellectual History 1842-1933 (Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 266. 
12 Rose Parfitt, “Empire des Nègres blancs: The Hybridity of International Personality and the Abyssinia 
Crisis of 1935-36,” Leiden Journal of International Law 24, no. 4 (2011): 849–72; Robbie Shilliam, 
“Intervention and Colonial-Modernity: Decolonising the Italy/Ethiopia Conflict through Psalms 68:31,” 
Review of International Studies 39, no. 5 (2013): 1140.  
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unsatisfactory nature of the criteria themselves—was palliated only by a strongly remedial view 
of League admission. Formal criteria were, implicitly, waived, and admission was less an 
acknowledgment of status as fact than a portal to state-making as process, in which the League 
Council might play an active role.  
This approach rendered the League’s “making” of Ethiopian statehood highly contingent on the 
interests of the European imperial powers, among other things. The linkage of admission and 
League-sponsored advice on Ethiopian administration—which might have enabled far-reaching 
interventions into Ethiopia—was ultimately not operationalized in the interwar years, until taken 
up opportunistically by Italy. The absence of concerted action earlier on was in part a result of 
inter-imperial competition between the three European powers most closely concerned with 
Ethiopia, turned to advantage by Ras Tafari to block any one power from insisting on a given 
program. But it also illustrated the limits of European thinking about processes of state-making in 
the interwar period. Just as there was uncertainty about the very definition of a state worthy of 
membership in the international order, there was a real dearth of theorization about how Ethiopia 
might reform, beyond approaches extrapolated from imperial administration or the mandate 
system. It was only in Ethiopia itself, under Ras Tafari, that one saw more concrete and 
experimental approaches to state-making.  
This same contingency was present in the League’s procedural dimensions. For a time, Ras Tafari 
was able to make occasional use of the platform and procedures associated with the League to 
assert Ethiopian interests in ways not possible within nineteenth-century diplomatic practice. 
Italian expansionism and Anglo-French appeasement limited the reach and power of League 
mechanisms to safeguard Ethiopia’s interests in the 1930, but Ethiopia’s use of the League 
platform to condemn the League’s own failure may have had resonance over the longer term, 
helping ensure Ethiopia’s re-emergence as a state after WWII. 
The Ethiopian trajectory offers a new perspective on interwar shifts. It reveals a moment of 
profound uncertainty in conceptions of statehood and belonging, as the international order was 
reconceived through the League. This offers an important counterpoint to the more abstract 
European (if not German) debates about the nature of the state and its relation to law, which often 
dominate intellectual histories of international law; and draws attention to the range and 
complexity of state-making and statecraft occurring outside any European or League-dominated 
context. But the interwar episode may also, I argue, complicate and enrich our sense of longer 
twentieth-century chronologies. Ethiopia is rather unusual in its political trajectory: one of only a 
few African polities to retain a nearly unbroken claim to independence from the late nineteenth 
century into the present, and to articulate itself for much of this time as an empire implicitly 
comparable in structure to contemporary European empires. Yet precisely these unusual 
characteristics make Ethiopia revealing for global trends, by forcing the articulation of 
assumptions which went unspoken in other cases. In particular, the Ethiopian case challenges a 
narrative that locates pathologies of peripheral statehood in post-1945 decolonization. The 
Ethiopian case suggests that ambivalence about what kind of state was required in an 
Forthcoming in (2019) 10 Humanity 
	 5 
institutionalized, culturally diverse international order long predated 1945, and the “failed” states 
emergent from decolonization. Indeed the “failure” might lie in the imagination of the state, and 
how it could be integrated into a newly-constituted international legal and political community. 
II. The nineteenth-century “family of nations” and its fringes 
In the late nineteenth century, the status of particular polities vis-à-vis a larger international 
community was approached through a largely Eurocentric “standard of civilization.” Although 
contemporary treatments—and later commentary—underscore the importance of a common 
religious and cultural core to the so-called “standard,”13 this “standard” also encompassed at least 
some reference to governmental machinery, including the government’s ability to assert authority 
over the whole of its territory. Such capacity was, in turn, a functional precondition for other 
markers of “civilized” status of particular importance to European commerce, like the operation 
of courts; protection of the person and property of foreign nationals; and fulfilment of obligations 
under the law of nations.14  
Despite the growing specificity of the “standard of civilization,” it never functioned in a binary 
way as the threshold for recognition or membership of what was often called the “family of 
nations.” Polities might be recognized as sovereign states, at least in and for the purposes of treaty-
making, but this did not necessarily amount to full membership in the “family.” 15  Indeed, 
provisions in many treaties for protection of foreign nationals, extraterritorial jurisdiction and the 
like marked the distance between non-European polities and the “civilized” world.  
Ethiopia existed on the fringes of this system, and exemplified its complexities. Successive rulers 
in the Ethiopian empire, sometimes styling themselves as subordinate rulers, and sometimes 
claiming a title of emperor over other rulers, had been able to consolidate power through 
alternating cooperation and conflict with European powers in adjacent territories.16 Menilek II 
(then negus or King of Shoa, one of two kings under Emperor Yohannes IV (r 1872–89)), solicited 
weapons from, and signed treaties with, Italy. By a convention of 1887, the Italians promised 
Menilek rifles, and undertook not to annex any of Menilek’s territory, in exchange for Menilek’s 
neutrality in any conflict between Italy and Emperor Yohannes. Attacks on Ethiopia’s western 																																																								
13 See, eg, Georg Schwarzenberger, “The Rule of Law and the Disintegration of the International 
Society,” American Journal of International Law 33, no. 1 (1939): 64–65; Mark Mazower, “An 
International Civilization? Empire, Internationalism and the Crisis of the Mid-Twentieth Century,” 
International Affairs 82, no. 3 (2006): 553. 
14 Gerrit W Gong, The Standard of Civilization in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1984), 14–17. 
15 Ibid., 24, 32–34. On the significance of treaty-making as entailing at least some recognition of de jure 
sovereignty, Charles Henry Alexandrowicz, The European-African Confrontation. A Study in Treaty 
Making (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1973). 
16 See, eg, on British relations with rulers in what would later be Ethiopia, E Hertslet, R W Brant, and H L 
Sherwood, eds., Map of Africa by Treaty, 3rd ed, vol. II (London: HMSO/Harrison & Sons, 1909), 419ff. 
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flank by Mahdist forces from the Sudan provided an opportunity for Menilek to move for the 
imperial throne. Yohannes IV was killed fighting the Mahdists, and Menilek was able to prevail 
over Yohannes’ son and heir, proclaiming himself Emperor in March 1889. 
Following his accession, Menilek entered into the Treaty of Wichalé with King Umberto I of Italy, 
settling Italo-Ethiopian relations, and acceded in 1890 to the General Act of the Brussels 
Conference relative to the African Slave Trade, a key article of which committed “[powers] 
exercising sovereignty or protectorate in Africa … to proceed gradually, as circumstances permit 
… with the repression of the Slave Trade.”17 The entry into treaties at least implied recognition of 
Ethiopia as an independent state. However, a key provision of the Treaty of Wichalé concerning 
relations between the two polities was ambiguous, or even intentionally deceptive on the part of 
Italian negotiators.18 The Italian Government claimed Ethiopia as a protectorate under the Berlin 
Congress regime for the management of claims to African territory. Menilek denied any 
protectorate existed. Italy turned to a strategy of force, but suffered a dramatic defeat at the battle 
of Adwa (1896). 
This Ethiopian victory at Adwa, felt as a profound shock across Europe, secured recognition by 
Italy of Ethiopia’s “absolute independence … as a sovereign and independent state.”19 However, 
Ethiopia remained confounding to a “standard of civilization” which tended to see Christianity, 
military prowess, and European forms of government and administration as being closely linked. 
Ethiopia’s adherence to an ancient Christianity, together with military success, had vindicated its 
standing against some aspects of this civilizational account. Many of Menilek’s modernization 
projects, pursued with the assistance of foreign advisers, and a small number of nationals educated 
abroad, also involved the creation of institutions and infrastructure broadly congruent with 
European states (state educational establishments; mail, telephone and telegraph services; a Bank 
of Abyssinia operated under concession to the National Bank of Egypt; and a railway, operated by 
a French concessionaire, which would by 1917 connect Addis Ababa to the coast at Djibouti).20 
																																																								
17 Art 3. On accession, see Edward Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty, 2nd and rev ed, vol. I (London: 
HMSO/Harrison & Sons, 1896), 48. The circumstances of the accession are not entirely clear; on the 
disputed question of whether Italy’s “representation” at Brussels strengthened Italy’s protectorate claim, 
Carlo Giglio, “Article 17 of the Treaty of Uccialli,” Journal of African History 6, no. 2 (1965): 226; Sven 
Rubenson, “Professor Giglio, Antonelli and Article XVII of the Treaty of Wichale,” Journal of African 
History 7, no. 3 (1966): 446.  
18 Richard Caulk, Between the Jaws of Hyenas. A Diplomatic History of Ethiopia (1876-1896), ed. Bahru 
Zewde (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2002), 153–267.  
19 Treaty of Addis Ababa (with Italy), 26 October 1896, art 3, CTS 183 (1979): 423. Similar recognition 
was implicit in other treaties with European powers, although post-1896 treaties did not, of themselves, 
unravel the agreements which other European powers had made with Italy since 1889 on the basis of its 
dubious status as protector. 
20 Harold G Marcus, A History of Ethiopia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 106–107; 
Bahru Zewde, Pioneers of Change in Ethiopia: The Reformist Intellectuals of the Early Twentieth 
Century (Oxford: James Currey, 2002), 23–24. 
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But European powers considered modes of government and administration of justice divergent 
enough from European norms to warrant assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction.21 
Under Yohannes and Menilek, Amharic- and Tigrinnya-speaking peoples, Christianized since the 
fourth century, had expanded southwards. The resulting empire encompassed dozens of other 
ethnic and linguistic groups, some Muslim, and others adhering to a range of indigenous religions. 
Beyond Addis Ababa, imperial authority was mediated through rases (variously translated as 
“heads,” “governors” or “dukes”) exercising considerable independent authority. In this regard, 
conceptions of sovereignty and authority were more layered than borderlines on the map 
suggested. This was true also for surrounding European colonies subject to systems of “indirect 
rule,” and for the Somaliland protectorates, administered from centres on the coast with limited 
reach into the hinterland. But Ethiopia was unique in having deeply entrenched slave-raiding and 
–trading practices. This had been central to the expansion of the empire and endured thereafter, 
although Menilek had formally prohibited sale and purchase of slaves in 1875. Slaves worked in 
domestic contexts far removed from the plantations of European colonies,22 and had some social 
mobility through education, but circumstances of capture and transfer were brutal, and raiding 
devastated whole regions.  
Despite formal independence after 1896, Ethiopia was left physically, juridically, and procedurally 
vulnerable. Ethiopia lacked any independent access to the sea, and was thus dependent on 
European colonial powers controlling surrounding territory (particularly the French in Djibouti) 
for importation of vital goods, including firearms. Paradoxically, recognition of Ethiopia as a 
territorially-bounded polity threw into sharp relief the weakness of the imperial centre in actually 
controlling the entirety of the territory.23 Britain, whose colonial possessions shared the longest 
stretch of frontier with Ethiopia, complained regularly about cross-border slave-raiding.  
Juridically, both publicists and the corpus of treaty law reflected ambiguity about Ethiopia’s status. 
Westlake numbered Ethiopia among the “Christian states to the dealings with which international 
law would be considered to apply, though they can hardly be ranked as contributing to its 
development or enforcement.” 24  Oppenheim listed Ethiopia (along with Morocco) as “full-
																																																								
21 Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between France and Ethiopia, 10 Jan 1908, art 7, British and 
Foreign State Papers 101 (1912): 997. Equivalent arrangements applied to other foreign nationals by 
virtue of “most favoured nation” clauses in other bilateral treaties with Ethiopia. 
22 Kevin Grant, A Civilised Savagery: Britain and the New Slaveries in Africa, 1884-1926 (New York: 
Routledge, 2005). 
23 On this perverse effect of delimiting borders, Ian S Spears, “The Ethiopian Crisis and the Emergence of 
Ethiopia in a Changing State System,” in Collision of Empires: Italy’s Invasion of Ethiopia and Its 
International Impact, ed. G Bruce Strang (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 37. 
24 John Westlake, International Law Part I: Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1904), 40. A 
similar treatment appears in the 2nd (1910) edition, without reference to the intervening Tripartite 
Agreement.  
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Sovereign States, but for some parts only within the Family of Nations.”25 The 1906 “Tripartite 
Agreement,” prompted by Menilek’s failing heath, spoke with two voices about Ethiopia’s future, 
describing the status quo (at least as between British, French and Italian signatories) with reference 
to border delimitation agreements made by Italy as “protector,” yet proclaiming that “the various 
Conventions mentioned in this Article do not in any way infringe the sovereign rights of the 
Emperor of Abyssinia.”26 Under the Tripartite Agreement, the European powers undertook that, 
in the event of the status quo being disturbed, they would “make every effort to preserve the 
integrity of Ethiopia” but, in any case, concert to protect each others’ interests. A separate 
agreement bound the European powers to “exercise a rigorous supervision over the importation of 
arms and ammunition.” 27 This ambiguity of Ethiopia’s standing in the international legal order on 
the eve of WWI was reflected, too, in procedural terms. The Ethiopian court remained on the 
margins of diplomatic dealings, with only limited and belated access to the texts of agreements 
which directly concerned Ethiopia.  
III. The League system and the idea of the state 
The political upheaval of WWI opened possibilities for a profound restructuring of relations 
between people, territory and political authority. Many of the more radical challenges to the status 
quo were quickly curbed: anti-colonial nationalism was marginalized within the post-war 
settlement, for example, and “minorities” provisions restricted to the new states of Eastern Europe, 
rather than being extended to religious or racial minorities everywhere. Nevertheless, in innovative 
structures of mandate colonialism, minorities supervision and territorial administration, the League 
Covenant seemed to hold out new trajectories of state-creation and development. The international 
community, as incarnated in the League, would be directly implicated in the cultivation of states 
of the right kind to function in a quasi-universal international order.  
As mentioned earlier, approaches to statehood and belonging under the aegis of the League were 
not necessarily coherent. In terms of legal technicalities, pathways to original membership, 
including being a signatory to the Treaty of Versailles, or a separate invitation to accede to the 																																																								
25 L Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1905), 157; L 
Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, ed. Ronald Francis Roxburgh (London: Longmans, Green and 
Co., 1920), 35, 180, 190. The leading French text, which divided states into “sovereign,” “protected” and 
“vassal” states, had no separate listing for Ethiopia in the 1894 edition, presumably encompassing it in a 
general reference to protected states in Africa. Editions after 1896 placed the entry for “Abyssinia” under 
“protected” states but noted Italy’s 1896 recognition: Henry Bonfils, Manuel de droit international 
public, 1st ed. (Paris: A Rousseau, 1894), 99; Henry Bonfils and Paul Fauchille, Manuel de droit 
international public, 5th ed. (Paris: A Rousseau, 1908), 105 (again without noting the Tripartite 
Agreement). 
26 See above n 1, art 1(a).  
27 Agreement between the United Kingdom, France and Italy respecting the Importation of Arms and 
Ammunition into Abyssinia, signed at London, December 13, 1906 [Cmd 3299], art 1. This was in some 
tension with Ethiopia’s position following accession to the Brussels General Act (see above n 17).   
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Covenant (doled out with some discretion by the major powers),28 facilitated the membership of 
many polities which would not have satisfied the criteria for admission after the League’s founding 
(on which this article focuses). The British Empire presented some particularly anomalous cases: 
the British Empire as a whole was a member of the League, yet the four dominions (not yet 
independent states) and India (which fell even further short of the “self-governing” threshold 
applicable to polities seeking admission after the League’s establishment) were also original 
members.29 While criteria for admission after the League’s founding became more formal and 
culturally neutral, the mandates regime remained grounded explicitly in civilizational hierarchies. 
Conditions devised in the 1930s for the release of polities from a mandate turned out to be 
considerably more searching than those for admission to the League by polities like Ethiopia, never 
subject to a mandate; even if these criteria for emergence to independence were never strictly 
applied. 
The development of criteria for admission to the League for those polities which were not original 
members, nor invited by consensus to accede to the Covenant, was shaped in part by the imagined 
dynamics of the future institution. In a system in which all members would have some (admittedly 
unequal) say in decision-making, there were incentives for the great powers to avoid a proliferation 
of smaller members. The notion of collective security also mitigated in favour of only admitting 
polities which could make some, even nominal, military contribution. As Zimmern observed, 
“difficulties about opening the League to all states, small or great, civilised or uncivilised, 
respectable or disreputable” led to “compromise in which one can see legalism at grips with 
considerations both of a realistic and of an ethical order.”30  
Although Wilson, (supported to some extent by the French) had sought to include in criteria for 
admission a requirement of popular self-government, it proved difficult to find a test that could 
accommodate the enormous diversity of polities thought to merit membership.31 Article 1 of the 
Covenant ultimately retained only faint traces of a substantive threshold for admission: 
Any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony [Fr: qui se gouverne librement] … 
may become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the 
Assembly, provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe 																																																								
28 See Georg Schwarzenberger, The League of Nations and World Order. A Treatise on the Principle of 
Universality in the Theory and Practice of the League of Nations (London: Constable & Co, 1936), 36–
37. 
29 David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, vol. II (New York: G P Putnam’s Sons, 1928), 
260–261, 303. On the situation of India, Stephen Legg, “An International Anomaly? Sovereignty, the 
League of Nations and India’s Princely Geographies,” Journal of Historical Geography 43 (2014): 100–
103. 
30 Alfred Eckhard Zimmern, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law (London: Macmillan, 1935), 
165. See also discussion in Alison Duxbury, The Participation of States in International Organisations. 
The Role of Human Rights and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 63–68. 
31 Malbone W Graham, The League of Nations and the Recognition of States (Cambridge University 
Press, 1933), 3. 
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its international obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the 
League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and armaments. 
Confronted with the first applications for membership, the League’s Fifth Committee (comprising 
representatives of all League members), seems to have felt a need for some more detailed 
assessment of potential members. Contrary to claims that the Fifth Committee “thoroughly 
investigated the problem [of criteria for admission] and … drew up a questionnaire” for 
consideration of whether applications satisfied the test in art 1,32 there seems to have been little 
principled examination of which polities ought to be admitted. The Fifth Committee simply 
adopted a questionnaire prepared by Viviani, a French delegate: 
(a) Was [the applicant’s] application for admission to the League in order? 
(b) Was the Government applying for admission recognised de jure or de facto and by 
which States? 
(c) Was the applicant a nation with a stable government and settled frontiers? What were 
its size and its population? 
(d) Was it fully self-governing? 
(e) What had been its conduct, including both acts and assurances, with regard to (i) its 
international obligations; (ii) the prescriptions of the League as to armaments?33 
Each application for membership went first before a small sub-committee of delegates, meeting in 
private and keeping minutes for circulation to the Committee only; their deliberations were 
presented back to the Fifth Committee in a report, later published, and the Committee’s own 
deliberations were open, with reasonably detailed minutes published. The Committee in turn 
drafted a report for the plenary Assembly.  
The Viviani questionnaire mingled language from the Covenant (“fully self-governing,” and 
assurances regarding international obligations and armaments), with pre-war recognition practice, 
and some basic practical desiderata (eg stable government and settled frontiers). Although Gong 
sees in the questionnaire “a codified expression of the standard of ‘civilization’,” 34  the 
questionnaire criteria actually involved far less explicit reference to structures of political 
authority, or internal administration, than had featured in nineteenth-century accounts of the 
“civilized” polity. Such considerations were captured only obliquely, in references to “stable 
government” and ability to satisfy international obligations. The loss of focus on internal political 
structures is reflected in the way in which different conceptions of “self-governing” flicker through 
early admission cases. In some cases reference to an absence of other polities claiming authority 																																																								
32 Lilian M. Friedlander, “The Admission of States to the League of Nations,” British Yearbook of 
International Law 9 (1928): 89. 
33 The Records of the First Assembly: Meetings of the Committees, vol. II (Geneva: League of Nations, 
1920), 159. 
34 Gong, Standard of Civilization, 126. 
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over the applicant sat alongside discussion of democratic modes of government,35 and in others 
the latter only was mentioned.36  
On the surface, the absence from the questionnaire of explicit reference to internal structures of 
political authority is surprising. Under the Covenant, states were assuming novel responsibilities, 
including (under art 10 of the Covenant) to preserve against external aggression the territorial 
integrity and “existing political independence” of all members. One might therefore have expected 
greater attention, for example, to a basic Weberian desideratum of a monopoly of force over a 
fixed area. The relative absence of such a conception from the Viviani questionnaire may have 
been due to the fact that Viviani was likely focused on ensuring strict scrutiny of any future 
German application.37 He may simply have assumed that the German government would be able 
to overcome postwar disorder in the country, and thus focused more on what were, for France, the 
key issues: “guarantees of [an applicant’s] sincere intention to observe its international 
obligations” (in the Covenant’s words), and the ability to investigate an applicant’s conduct and 
acts under para (e) of the questionnaire.  
Aspects of the Viviani questionnaire were challenged, and quickly fell by the wayside. Latin 
American delegates contested any requirement for recognition as a condition of membership, and 
in practice this criterion was read loosely. Practice on early admissions indicated that, as a matter 
of practicality, admission would entail eventual recognition of the state (if not the government then 
in power) by most other League members.38 Recognition, previously a discretionary and bilateral 
process, was to some extent superseded by a majoritarian decision about admission into the 
international community—although the absence of the US and the USSR from the League 
precluded this shift from being wholly entrenched.39  
In strictly legal terms, the Viviani questionnaire was not determinative of anything. League 
members had the right to vote as they wished on applications for admission (and arguably might 
vote against admission even if they believed the applicant satisfied criteria in art 1(2) of the 
Covenant).40 However, the parameters of the questionnaire, together with the formalized and 
partly public nature of discussions, seems to have curbed the sorts of arguments which delegates 
felt comfortable raising against admission. At least in Committee sessions, objections were lodged 
within the questionnaire’s categories (and even then, with some diffidence). Certain contested 
cases related essentially to doubts about the political intentions of former Central Powers. 																																																								
35 See, eg, Records of the First Assembly: Meetings of the Committees, vol. II, 220 (on Costa Rica). 
36 See, eg, The Records of the Second Assembly: Meetings of the Committees, vol. II (Geneva: League of 
Nations, 1921), 580 (on Estonia).  
37 Graham, The League of Nations and the Recognition of States, 63 n 49 (citing interviews with 
Secretariat staff). 
38 Ibid., 39–41. 
39 Martin Clark, “A Conceptual History of Recognition in International Law,” British Yearbook of 
International Law 87 (2016). 
40 Jean Ray, Commentaire du Pacte de la Société des Nations (Paris: Sirey, 1930), 97. 
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Applications from some of the Caucasus states (Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia) and 
Baltic states (Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania) were subject to serious questions concerning stability of 
government, territory and borders. Given ongoing conflict in the Soviet Union, there was a 
reluctance to extend to these polities an undertaking to contemplate action in their defence.41 
On the other hand, discussion reflected an impetus for inclusion at the expense of a strict 
application of the Covenant or questionnaire criteria.42 The admission in 1921 of the Baltic states 
was urged not despite, but because these states “were experiencing great political, financial, and 
commercial difficulties.”43 Provided there was some government in place, even if “not of the most 
elaborate description,” and defensible borders, even instability of government was not treated as 
weighing seriously against admission — and instability of government was sometimes weighed 
against other factors, such as “strong national sentiment” and a “definite … race, speaking a 
common … language.” 44  Where the Fifth Committee supported applications, the plenary 
Assembly tended to vote unanimously or near-unanimously in favour, in a spirit of celebration at 
the expansion of the League. The only concession to anxieties about internal administration was a 
proposal to impose on some new states obligations relating to protection of minorities, analogous 
to those imposed by some of the peace treaties. While conceding that it was undesirable to 
“interfere in the internal policy of States,” Robert Cecil pointed out that these struggles were not 
purely internal but rather fueled inter-state conflict.45 However, there was uneasiness among other 
delegates about imposing additional conditions, and the idea was ultimately confined to Albania 
and Baltic/Caucasus states, and framed as a recommendation.46  
IV. Ethiopian admission and the outer bounds of the League community 
Ethiopia presented a unique challenge to criteria for League admission. Unlike some of the Baltic 
and Caucasus states, Ethiopia enjoyed recognition by major European powers. It also had relatively 
defined borders. In 1919, Ethiopia was ruled by Menilek’s daughter (Empress Zawditu), and Ras 
Tafari (as regent and heir),47 and thus enjoyed “stable” government, in the sense that there was no 																																																								
41 A decision on the Baltic states was postponed to 1921, when they were finally admitted; the Caucasus 
states were not ultimately admitted: Friedlander, “The Admission of States to the League of Nations,” 95–
96. 
42 When the Serb–Croat–Slovene delegate relinquished opposition to Bulgaria’s admission, for example, 
he observed that he was “[f]ollowing most of his colleagues” in “abandon[ing] the strict application of the 
Covenant.”: Records of the First Assembly: Meetings of the Committees, vol. II, 194.  
43 Records of the Second Assembly: Meetings of the Committees, vol. II, 532 (Nansen).  
44 See, eg, Report of Sub-Committee Vb on the Admission of Albania, Bulgaria, Austria and 
Liechtenstein, 27 Nov 1920, in Records of the First Assembly: Meetings of the Committees, vol. II, 212, 
214 (dealing with Albania). 
45 Records of the First Assembly: Meetings of the Committees, vol. II, 204. 
46 See Duxbury, Participation of States in International Organisations, 78. 
47 This conjunction resulted from a coup displacing Menilek’s immediate successor, Lij Iyasu, who 
appeared to the court too erratic, and too drawn to Islam, to continue in power. Marcus, Haile Sellassie I, 
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clear rival to the imperial dynasty, despite tensions within it (Ras Tafari, educated in French by 
the head of a Capucin school in Ethiopia, and the son of a trusted collaborator of Menilek, had 
reformist ambitions, but had to contend with more “conservative” forces in the form of the clerical 
hierarchy, Empress and the Minister for War).48 Ethiopia was “self-governing” in the sense that it 
was not subject to any formal external influence. However, the imperial court’s ability to govern 
remained constrained by the power of provincial rases, who pursued their own financial and 
dynastic interests. While this weakness of central control was not necessarily qualitatively distinct 
from that seen in some then-chaotic European polities,49 Ethiopia did present a particularly stark 
test of the extent to which internal political structures, and the extent of governmental control over 
territory, might be relevant to League admission.  
European powers had tended to see Ethiopia primarily through the lens of imperial interests, albeit 
of somewhat different kinds. Italy nurtured aspirations, of varying specificity over time, for 
territorial gain, and even settlement. French and British interests reflected a more commercially-
inflected imperial project, preoccupied with territory only as a means of furthering commercial 
exploitation. France was chiefly interested in Ethiopia as a means of stimulating trade through the 
small and otherwise worthless coastal colony of Djibouti, and the chief British interest in Ethiopia 
after WWI was the construction of a dam on Lake Tana that would enable the development of 
cotton plantations in the Sudan.50 In addition, the European powers also had a concrete interest in 
Ethiopia’s internal administration, particularly capacity to maintain order in the border areas and 
rein in cross-border slave-raiding. This last concern was most acute for Britain, insofar as British 
colonies shared much longer borders with Ethiopia than French or Italian possessions did. 
 Within the Foreign Office, officials understood Ethiopia to be in a sort of no-man’s-land: formally 
independent but also in need of fundamental reordering. This reordering would, it was assumed, 
unfold with the sponsorship of European powers. A British national, Colonel Sandford, who had 
served in the British legation in 1913–14, and returned to Addis Ababa in a commercial capacity, 
laid out the most detailed vision in an unsolicited proposal to the FO in 1921. Sandford saw the 
fundamental difficulty as “the lack of a stable Government strong enough to impose its will on the 
chiefs and peoples of the country.” In an odd transposition of English history, he characterized the 
situation as reminiscent of “the struggles between the King and the barons … of Plantagenet days”: 																																																								
3–4; Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia 1855-1991, 2nd ed (Oxford: James Currey, 2001), 128–
31.  
48 Zewde, History, 130–31. 
49 For an argument that material conditions in Europe and Africa were in fact not as far apart as engrained 
racial and cultural assumptions suggested, see Siba N Grovogui, “Sovereignty in Africa: Quasi-Statehood 
and Other Myths in International Theory,” in Africa’s Challenge to International Relations Theory, ed. 
Kevin C Dunn and Timothy M Shaw (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 29–45. 
50 For this regional, hydraulic vision, see, eg, Terje Tvedt, The River Nile in the Age of the British: 
Political Ecology and the Quest for Economic Power (London: I B Tauris, 2004); “Hydrology and 
Empire: The Nile, Water Imperialism and the Partition of Africa,” Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 39, no. 2 (2011): 173–94. 
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the Negus (king) was forced to maintain his authority by giving offices and lands as rewards, but 
crushing any chief who became too powerful, with the effect that the rases lacked security of 
tenure, and resorted to unstable combinations among themselves to maintain their positions against 
the centre. Sandford suggested that Britain offer to back Ras Tafari and his heirs as against the 
rases, on the condition that he offer the rases equivalent security of tenure. This, Sandford thought, 
would secure a more stable political structure, and lay foundations for a treaty by which Britain 
would guarantee Ethiopian independence and integrity. 51 British officials were not averse to 
projects of this kind, and even believed that “a large portion of the people … would welcome the 
establishment of competent administration under pressure by the interested powers.”52 But Britain 
was forestalled by the Tripartite Agreement from acting alone, and neither Italy nor France would 
cooperate on the lines envisaged.53 In the circumstances, the FO saw no alternative to “let[ting] 
Abyssinia totter along and trust[ing] that the inevitable eventual dissolution does not occur until 
the general political situation is more favourable for dealing with it.”54 
On the other hand, anti-slavery activists were envisaging new techniques of intervention in and 
through the League. J H Harris, head of the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society 
(ASAPS), took press accounts by former British officials, detailing slave-raiding and trading, and 
decay in Menilek’s work of modernization, as the basis for a public campaign in favour of some 
sui generis role for the League in Ethiopia.55 Arguing (implausibly) that the Tripartite Agreement 
was already “in the closest harmony with the main principles of the League of Nations,” Harris 
proposed that it be “transfer[red]” to the League. Ethiopia could apply for membership, but would 
be held not to have the requisite sincere intentions to observe international obligations (on the basis 
that slavery was rife); in the interim, the League would extend protection, and assistance through 
one or more commissioners.56 Other liberal internationalists agreed: “strong and independent and 
progressive African Government” could only be attained with “disinterested assistance.” As the 
commissioner/s would act for the League, there would be no fear of annexation.57 Frederick 
Lugard, then a key figure in British colonial administration, was skeptical that League 
commissioners would be welcomed by Ras Tafari unless they brought weapons to match the rases. 
Commissioners, however, would only furnish such weapons if there was reliable supervision of 
their use, which Ras Tafari would not accept. For Lugard, the more plausible alternative would be 																																																								
51 Sandford to Dodds, 22 Jul 1921, FO 371/5509 [A 5725/5725/1]. 
52 Dodds, 26 Sep 1921, FO 371/5509 [A 5725/5725/1].  
53 Minutes Seymour, 16 Oct 1921, Sperling and Tyrrell, both 20 Oct 1921; all FO 371/5509 [A 
5725/5725/1].  
54 Minutes Curzon, 24 Oct 1921; Sperling, 20 Oct 1921; both FO 371/5509 [A 5725/5725/1].  
55 On Harris’ activism, Suzanne Miers, Slavery in the Twentieth Century. The Evolution of a Global 
Problem (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2003), 63–65, 75.  
56 [John H Harris], “Slavery in Abyssinia. How the League Could Help. A Modern Gordon Needed,” 
Westminster Gazette, 28 Apr 1922, 1. 
57 Gilbert Murray to Editor, Westminster Gazette, 2 May 1922, 3. See also accompanying letter in same 
sense from Henry Cavendish-Bentinck.  
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American or British “advisers … qualified by African administrative experience,” with League 
supervision or partition into spheres of influence a second resort.  
Ras Tafari had made tentative inquiries of French contacts in 1919 about League membership, 
seeing this as a vehicle for vindication of Ethiopia’s status, and protection against imperial 
domination.58 However, it appears to have been increasing pressure from anti-slavery activists for 
something like a mandate which precipitated an application for admission.59  Ras Tafari saw 
membership as a guarantee of, and protection for, statehood, and persuaded the Empress, Fitawrari 
Habta Giorgis, and important rases and clergy, of the benefits,60 including in relation to access to 
arms.61  
The application for admission, made formally on 1 August 1923, required states to articulate their 
positions on Ethiopia’s status in a manner compatible with the new parameters established by art 
1 of the Covenant and the Viviani questionnaire. France was supportive of admission, and helped 
make the Ethiopian case, if only because a thriving independent Ethiopia guaranteed commerce 
through Djibouti. Italy was not disposed to support admission, believing that this would undermine 
what leverage remained under the Tripartite Agreement. However, Italy would change position in 
the course of deliberations, to avoid needlessly offending Ras Tafari, and to align with France 
(French support then being required in connection with the Corfu crisis).62 Britain was perhaps the 
most focused of the three European imperial powers on systemic considerations, and British 
deliberations showcase in particular detail efforts to grapple with the compatibility of political 
conditions in Ethiopia with the demands of League membership.  
Echoing longstanding, and circular, arguments over access to arms, officials expressed doubts 
about the ability of the imperial government to maintain order:  
[If admitted, e]ither Abyssinia, as a member, would be left to give effective guarantees as 
provided in Art 1 of the Covenant, which would mean that France would flood the country 
with rifles on the pretext that Abyssinia required them to put down slavery;  																																																								
58 Pierre-Alype, Sous la couronne de Salomon: L’Empire des Négus. De la Reine de Saba à la Société des 
Nations [1925], new, updated ed (Paris: Plon, 1935), 265. 
59 Miers, Slavery in the Twentieth Century, 72–74. See also Amalia Ribi Forclaz, Humanitarian 
Imperialism: The Politics of Anti-Slavery Activism, 1880-1940 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 
64–66. 
60 Lukian Prijac, Lagarde l’Éthiopien: Le fondateur de Djibouti, 1860-1936 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2012), 
271–281; on the deft way in which Ras Tafari rendered into Amharic the idea of the League, see Parfitt, 
“Empire des Nègres blancs,” 861–863.  
61 France had advised Ras Tafari that, on joining the League, Ethiopia could accede to the Treaty of St 
Germain, and negotiate for arms supplies under it, rather than being consigned to the “prohibited zone” in 
which importation was heavily controlled: Convention for the Control of the Trade in Arms and 
Ammunition, signed 10 Sep 1919 (never entered into force), LNTS 7 (1921–22): 331. 
62 For a general outline of the main actors’ positions, Antoinette Iadarola, “Ethiopia’s Admission into the 
League of Nations: An Assessment of Motives,” International Journal of African Historical Studies 8, no. 
4 (1975): 601–22. 
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Or Abyssinia would announce its inability to comply with the requirements of the League 
without outside assistance, which would mean that we, having taken the initiative, should 
be called upon to do the dirty + expensive work of policing the country, a proceeding 
fraught with the certainty of political complications with France and Italy.63 
One commented that if the League “insists on Abyssinia putting her house in order, before 
admission, then the date of admission will be somewhat remote + will be preceded by a bloody 
revolution.”64 
Misgivings were strengthened by consular letters describing conditions in some remote provinces. 
Governors were not paid by the central government, and could not support soldiers from the 
surrounding tenant farmers, so permitted them to engage in looting. Slave-raiding was widespread. 
The consuls understood not simply as a failure of the central government to assert authority, but 
as a matter of the composition and structure of the polity:  
… no piece of country south of Addis Ababa is Abyssinia. It all belongs to different and 
distinct tribes. If Abyssinia … said to the Powers, “You bully me because you are strong,” 
exactly the same words could be said by the subject tribes to Abyssinia. … One is sorry 
for Ras Taffari, who has an impossible task in hand. … The Ras himself can have no idea 
how this part of Abyssinia has been devastated. The King’s writ does not run here.65  
Officials knew that slavery, in particular, was a problem in mandates and even other potential 
League member states, but they believed its prevalence in Ethiopia indicated “the absurdity of 
Abyssinia being considered … a civilized or even semi-civilized country.”66  Rennell Rodd, who 
had negotiated with Menilek in the late nineteenth century, conceded that Ethiopia’s ancient 
Christianity might favour admission on civilizational grounds, but reiterated colleagues’ concerns 
about the viability of Ethiopian statehood, and framed them in the new language of the Covenant:  
[H]ow far is Abyssinia a real entity as a self-governing State? Abyssinia consists of a 
number of kingdoms or principalities, the ruler of one of which from time to time has 
established his authority as overlord or king of kings. When he has been a strong man like 
Menelik he has undoubtedly ruled over the whole country, and treated the other princes or 
rasses as mere vassals. The [current] central Government … hardly exercises the control 
																																																								
63 Minute Sperling, 20 July 1923, FO 371/8405 [A 4543/142/1].  
64 “… If the League admits her without radical reforms, the one result will be to bring the League into 
disrepute, without achieving any of the good purposes which prompted those who have put the 
Abyssinian Govt up to making this demand.”: Minute Dodd, 11 Aug 1923, FO 371/8405 [A 4789/142/1]. 
65 Hodson to Russell, 6 June 1923, encl with Russell to Curzon, 14 Aug 1923, FO 371/8409 [A 
5378/2781/1]. Russell, then the British plenipotentiary in Addis, would also later object to a territorial 
guarantee being offered to the whole of Abyssinia, seeing scope for European influence or beneficent rule 
over tribes in the south: Russell to Curzon, 14 Aug 1923, FO 371/8409 [A5380/5097/1]. 
66 Minute Warner, 13 Sep 1923. Officials added observations on: Tyrrell, 14 Sep 1923; both FO 371/8409 
[A 5378/2781/1]. 
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over certain sections of the country which would entitle it to give “effective guarantees of 
its sincere intention to observe its international obligations.”67  
These internal deliberations showcase the range of civilizational and functional considerations 
deployed to assess Ethiopian standing.  
The instructions issued by the FO to Robert Cecil, then the British Empire delegate in Geneva, 
indicated that the application ought not to be accepted, and stipulated that this should be “delicately 
handled” to avoid suspicion that Britain had designs on Ethiopia.68 These instructions did not 
ultimately determine Cecil’s course: they did not reach him in time, and he instead followed his 
own inclinations.69 But the instructions do offer a useful reflection of how little the FO had 
understood about the way in which the League procedures changed the possibility of Britain 
“delicately” stifling outcomes it did not favour. 
In the League, Ethiopia’s application was sent first to a sub-committee (comprising representatives 
of the British Empire, France, Italy, Latvia, Persia, Romania and Finland). The French 
representative was quick to head off anticipated objections by proposing a form of declaration 
concerning Ethiopia’s obligations under the Arms Traffic Convention of 1919. Italy was by this 
time deciding that it ought not to bear the opprobrium of opposing admission if it seemed 
impossible to block.70 The rubric of the questionnaire channeled discussion in ways that made it 
difficult to air British objections. As Cecil explained to the FO, the sub-committee’s “duty is only 
to enquire into the facts of the Government of Abyssinia, the extent to which she has carried out 
her international obligations, etc. … The whole of the brunt of showing that Abyssinia is not yet fit 
to become a member of the League has been thrown upon us.” 71  
Cecil succeeded in introducing some of the British concerns into debate:  
“The Sub-Committee is of opinion that Abyssinia is fully self-governing, but has not been 
able to determine with any certainty the extent of the power of the central authority over 
provinces remote from the capital … [and] [i]t cannot …  state that her engagements have 
always been strictly fulfilled in the past.”72 
																																																								
67 Note by Sir R. Rodd on the Abyssinian Request for Admission to the League of Nations, 26 Aug 1923, 
FO 371/8409 [A 5209/5097/1] (emphasis added).  
68 Memorandum for Lord R. Cecil, 3 Sep 1923, FO 371/8409 [A 5205/5097/1]. 
69 Cecil was anxious not to be too severe on Ethiopia lest the same thresholds hamstring Britain’s then-
planned attempt to have Iraq join the League (something which ultimately only occurred much later); he 
thought it unwise to ask for effective guarantees on slavery, which he believed could only lead to 
exclusion: Cecil to FO, 7 Sep 1923, FO 371/8409 [A 5356/5097/1]. 
70 FO to Mr London (Geneva) for Cecil, 5 Sep 1923, FO 371/8409 [A 5351/5097/1]. 
71 Tufton to Sperling, 15 Sep 1923, FO 371/8410 [A 5570/5097/1] (emphasis added). 
72 Abyssinia’s Application for Admission to the League. Report of the Second Sub-Committee, 14 Sep 
1923, LNOJSS 19 (1923): 32 (emphasis added).  
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Deliberations in the Sixth Committee illustrated the tensions between competing approaches to 
statehood and belonging in the international legal order. The Australian delegate spoke an older 
language of “degrees” of civilization, and defended its ongoing force by reference to the way it 
grounded the continuing division between “A,” “B” and “C” mandates.73 The Ethiopian delegation 
engaged in distinctive ways with the civilizational discourse, offering ancient biblical antecedents 
of the ruling house, and Christian observance, as evidence of a civilization that was distinct yet 
commensurable with the thresholds assumed by international law.74 Others resisted as “unwise 
and dangerous” a “classification which might re-open the way to prejudices of race, caste, colour 
and nationality,”75 and asserted as the appropriate rubric the more formal criteria developed in the 
Covenant and League.76  
Yet the  questionnaire criteria, posited as the new threshold for admission, were not felt to be 
satisfactory either. Motta (Switzerland) pointed out that the question of the central government’s 
power over remote provinces “was a very important one,” and favoured further inquiries.77 The 
Venezuelan representative, continuing earlier Latin American objections to imposing conditions 
other than those explicitly mentioned in art 1 of the Covenant, called this “a question of internal 
politics.”78 But this “internal politics” was critical to coexistence with other surrounding polities. 
The British Empire representative tried to insinuate a concern about state capacity back into the 
four corners of the questionnaire by adverting again to the connection between past failures to 
uphold engagements and the viability of effectual guarantees as to future conduct.79  
The repression of slavery, a key signifier of civilization in the nineteenth century, re-emerged in 
these debates as a proxy for a new, functional vision of statehood, proper to a League system 
which, in guaranteeing states’ territorial integrity, and envisaging ever-closer interstate 
cooperation, arguably demanded a greater degree of control over territory than looser nineteenth-
century arrangements had done. One response from Ethiopia and France was to concede 
weaknesses in the degree of control which would be functionally optimal, but excuse it on the 																																																								
73 See, eg, LNOJSS 19 (1923): 12–13, 15, 21. 
74 Parfitt, “Empire des Nègres blancs,” 863–865. It may not be possible, however, to read the Abyssinian 
delegation’s interventions as wholly reflective of Abyssinian choices. Léonce Lagarde, founder of the 
Djibouti colony, helped to shepherd the application through the League apparatus, acting as a go-between 
between Tafari and the French Ministère des affaires étrangères. Ras Tafari’s French legal adviser, 
Bellefonds, was present in Geneva and reported by British anti-slavery activists to dominate the 
delegation’s discussions with others: FO 371/8406. That said, Ras Tafari was insistent on receiving 
reports from the delegation, and retaining the ultimate decision-making authority: Prijac, Lagarde 
l’Éthiopien, 274–79. 
75 LNOJSS 19 (1923): 20 (Jouvenel (France)). 
76 Ibid., 15 (Louwers (Belgium)). See detailed discussion in Becker Lorca, Mestizo International Law, 
278–279. 
77 LNOJSS 19 (1923): 14.  
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid., 15 (Wood (British Empire)). 
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basis of an implicit comparison between unitary states and empires. The French delegate took 
seriously Ethiopia’s self-understanding as an empire, and suggested that Ethiopia’s lack of 
“effective control” was not markedly worse than than of “all Colonial Governments.”80 Yet even 
on this basis, Ethiopia’s claim was precarious. Repression of the slave trade had long been a marker 
of sound imperial administration so, whether assessed against an implicit model of statehood or 
empire, Ethiopia appeared frail.  
As if conceding that there were concerns which were not captured by the questionnaire, delegates 
embraced a remedial view of membership. As Motta put it: even if an enquiry showed that Ethiopia 
could not presently undertake the engagements made in its declarations, it ought still to be admitted 
as admission “must assist the work of that Government.” 81  Following Ethiopian complaints 
regarding comments on the extent of the central government’s power, and fulfilment of obligations 
in the past, this language was massaged somewhat in the final subcommittee report. But, on French 
advice, Ras Tafari agreed to declare adherence to an obligation in the Convention of St-Germain-
en-Laye (1919) to inter alia “endeavour to secure the complete suppression of slavery in all its 
forms and of the slave trade by land and sea,”82 to conform to its stipulations on arms importations, 
and to “furnish the Council with any information which it may require, and to take into 
consideration any recommendations which the Council may make with regard to the fulfilment of 
these obligations.”83 The British Empire sensed that further objection would be fruitless. The Sixth 
Committee and Assembly voted unanimously for admission.  
Ethiopia’s rapid evolution from a polity not even considered by leading powers as a potential 
member in 1919, to one admitted with universal support in 1923, illustrated major shifts in thinking 
about statehood and belonging under the aegis of the League. The old touchstone of “civilization,” 
with its assemblage of European-style governing and judicial institutions, military prowess, 
cultural and religious dimensions, had become highly contested, and was supplemented, at least 
on the surface, by new criteria that were considerably less searching on matters of internal political 
structures and governmental capacity. 84  The minimalist account of statehood against which 																																																								
80 Ibid., 20 (Jouvenel (France)) (emphasis added). 
81 Ibid., 16; see also comments by Portuguese and Belgian delegates at 13, 15. 
82 The Convention revised the general obligations in the Berlin and Brussels General Acts; hence the need 
for it to restate the general obligation to suppress slavery and the slave trade. 
83 Admission of Ethiopia, Proposal by the Special Subcommittee, A.VI 5 1923; Report of the Second 
Sub-Committee of the Sixth Committee, revised text, LNOJSS 19 (1923): 34.  
84 They look all the more minimalist when contrasted with those proposed later for the exit of polities 
from mandatory rule, including that a mandate 
(a) … have a settled Government and an administration capable of maintaining the regular 
operation of essential Government services;  
(b) … be capable of maintaining its territorial integrity and political independence,  
(c) … be able to maintain the public peace throughout the whole territory  
(d) … have at its disposal adequate financial resources to provide regularly for normal 
Government requirements;  
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Ethiopia was measured, and the relatively constrained attention to internal political structures, was 
carried over into the definition of a state in the Pan-American Montevideo Convention on the 
Rights and Duties of States (1933).85 This definition would, over time, come to attain general 
relevance and even the status of customary international law (though it was never determinative 
in contested cases of when states came into being, or ceased to be).86 Yet the older civilizational 
language would re-emerge in League debates in the 1930s, and remained influential in political 
rhetoric and legal thought.87 
The partial displacement of older civilizational criteria was only really possible in conjunction 
with changes wrought by the League to modes of interstate diplomacy. Passage from a system in 
which both recognition and subtler determinations of the outer bounds of the “family of nations” 
were controlled by other (largely European) states or publicists, to super-majoritarian 
determination of their application, and collective, relatively public assessment of candidates, did 
not eliminate the preponderance of great powers in deliberations. It did, however, mean that, if 
admission was supported by at least one major power, it was difficult for others to build a coalition 
against admission. The opportunity for public deliberation about Ethiopia’s status allowed the 
Ethiopian delegation to offer an account of their own civilization, and forced delegations to mute 
or attenuate their attacks on Ethiopian status (though still treating the Ethiopian delegation in a 
way they would not have treated European peers). Whereas British and Italian governments had 
been able to agree between themselves in 1919 to exclude Ethiopia as a founding member, these 
positions were much harder to maintain in the League’s public fora, when adverse comments 
would antagonize the Ethiopian government, other small states, and domestic humanitarian and 
internationalist constituencies. Moreover, the very existence of the League, and the remedial 
possibilities it offered, seems to have underwritten an expansive approach to admission.  
What might we make of this admission process, both for Ethiopia and for larger histories of 
statehood? Parfitt highlights the way in which League admission reinscribed, rather than 
transcended, older hierarchies. She argues that Ethiopia “passed all [the] tests” in the standard 
questionnaire; the fact that Ethiopia was nevertheless “forced to accede” to “special obligations” 																																																								
(e) … possess laws and a judicial organisation which will afford equal and regular justice to all: 
LNOJ 12 (1931): 2056, 2057. 
However, the announced criteria were not strictly applied in the only case of exit from a mandate (Iraq) : 
see Susan Pedersen, The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), 268–286. 
85 “The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent 
population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other 
states.” On the genesis of the Montevideo criteria, and the deliberate marginalization of a culturally-
inflected reference to “civilization,” see Becker Lorca, Mestizo International Law, 334–341; see also 
Thomas D Grant, “Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and Its Discontents,” Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 37, no. 2 (1999): 403–458. 
86 The definition alone did not settle questions about the terms on which secession, for example, or the 
extinction of statehood, could occur. 
87 See above n 13.  
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in the form of two treaty articles on slavery and arms imports “constituted Ethiopia’s interwar 
personality as … both sovereign and less-than-sovereign.”88 I share the sense that admission to the 
League involved encoding a “hybrid” personality for Ethiopia. Yet the imposition of specific treaty 
obligations, while invidious, was only one mark of Ethiopia’s subjection (especially as the 
obligation to suppress slavery, in particular, reiterated one already acceded to by Menilek).89 The 
more telling dimension of admission might be the acknowledged hollowness of the formal criteria 
as applied. Ethiopia (like some of the other European polities considered around the same time) 
might technically have “passed” the tests in the questionnaire, but it was clear that many felt that 
the questionnaire did not address squarely the critical desideratum of effective control over 
territory; and that strict compliance with the questionnaire criteria had effectively been waived. 
This bypassing of formal criteria was linked conceptually to a remedial emphasis, and an 
undertaking to “take into consideration any recommendations which the Council may make with 
regard to the fulfilment of [Ethiopia’s] obligations.” While Becker Lorca highlights the way in 
which formal criteria for statehood, articulated and defended within the League, privileged 
territorial control as a means of asserting political independence, and were later harnessed to Latin 
American arguments for non-intervention, 90  the Ethiopia case suggests another contrasting 
development. Territorial control was weak or non-existent in the outer reaches of the empire. The 
response was not exclusion, but admission “on credit” (à crédit),91 with a mechanism for Council 
oversight: a new model of statehood with a permanent potential for intervention.  
V. Ethiopian state-making in the shadow of the League 
The creation of the League had fostered new criteria against which Ethiopia’s status would be 
assessed, and shaped the sorts of positions other states could take in that assessment. Yet the 
League also offered ongoing possibilities for the shaping of Ethiopian statehood. On one hand, it 
was a site in which Ethiopia could interact with European powers on a footing of greater equality 
than that existing in the late nineteenth century, and thus entrench and confirm its sovereign status. 																																																								
88 Parfitt, “Empire des Nègres blancs,” 859. 
89 Allain mentions that Ethiopia had not acceded to the Brussels General Act: Jean Allain, “Slavery and 
the League of Nations: Ethiopia as a Civilised Nation,” Journal of the History of International Law 8, no. 
2 (2006): 222. However, see above n 17. Menilek had clearly understood the Brussels obligation: see 
comments to British negotiators in 1897, described in James Rennell Rodd, Social and Diplomatic 
Memories 1894–1901. Egypt and Abyssinia (London: Edward Arnold, 1923), 165–166. Menilek’s 
predecessor, the Emperor Yohannes, had also bound himself and successors in an 1884 treaty with Britain 
to prohibit, to the best of his ability, buying and selling of slaves within his dominions, and their import or 
export: FO 93/2/3. 
90 Becker Lorca, Mestizo International Law, 306ff; Juan Pablo Scarfi, The Hidden History of 
International Law in the Americas: Empire and Legal Networks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 
151–52. 
91 Pierre-Alype, Sous la couronne de Salomon: L’Empire des Négus. De la Reine de Saba à la Société des 
Nations [1925], Note liminaire pour la nouvelle édition, ii. Pierre-Alype, a French colonial administrator 
involved in commercial affairs in Ethiopia, was involved with the admissions negotiations.  
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On the other hand, the League offered procedural mechanisms through which European powers, 
dominant in the Council, might seek to advise and guide governmental policy. The operation of 
these dimensions of the League was contingent on the issues at stake, and larger interests of the 
major powers, which enjoyed disproportionate influence in the Secretariat and League organs, but 
the League apparatus itself imposed some constraints.  
Although the Ethiopian delegations at the League Assembly were often small, and made very few 
contributions in the Assembly or committees,92 Ras Tafari did occasionally use mechanisms 
offered by the League to vindicate Ethiopia’s status as a full member of the international legal 
order. One striking example occurred in 1926. Frustrated by an inability to advance their own 
interests in bilateral negotiations with Ethiopia, Britain and France entered into an exchange of 
notes providing that Mussolini would support British requests (for a concession for construction 
of a massive dam on Lake Tana), in return for British support for Italian desiderata (concessions 
for a railway to loop through Ethiopia connecting Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, and a zone of 
Italian “exclusive economic influence”). The coordination of these far-reaching requests was 
highly threatening to Ethiopian interests, and the form of the exchange of notes, together with the 
fact it was only shown to Ras Tafari well after the fact, was reminiscent of the Tripartite Agreement 
of 1906.  
At this point, the League made a tangible difference to Ras Tafari’s position. He sent a letter of 
protest to the League, contrasting assumptions of equality and independence bound up with 
admission with the fact that “the two Governments are endeavouring to exert pressure on us in 
order to induce us to comply with their demands prematurely, without leaving any time for 
reflection or consideration for our people’s needs.”93 The British and Italian governments were 
forced to disclaim any coercive intent. 94  The League involvement invited critical questions, 
particularly in the British Parliament. Ras Tafari might have pressed to have the matter listed in 
the Council, but chose instead to simply place on record his view that the exchange was 
incompatible with the Covenant, and the subsequent anodyne interpretations offered by the 
governments, which robbed the exchange of much of its political utility. League procedures 
offered a forum in which Ethiopia could contest great power machinations on a footing of formal 
equality, and indeed drawing on the natural sympathies of other smaller states confronting great 
power oppression.  
The prospect of League-sponsored investigation or intervention on slavery, on the other hand, 
constituted a recurring threat to Ras Tafari and the standing of the Ethiopian Empire. Perhaps 
surprisingly, given the terms on which Ethiopian admission was granted, the vision of League 																																																								
92 Based on a survey of all Assembly and committee proceedings during Ethiopia’s membership of the 
League. There was a brief and ambitious effort to use Chinese campaigns for revision of unequal treaties 
as a means of revisiting the Tripartite Agreement, but this seems not to have been pursued: LNOJSS 76 
(1929): 47, 55–56.  
93 As published in LNOJ 7 (1926): 1517. 
94 See LNOJ 7 (1926): 1524–25. 
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Council advice or assistance on slavery did not materialize. Indeed, Ethiopia was largely beyond 
the reach of the League’s more technocratic efforts towards the remaking of state policy and 
administrations. The work of the League and International Labour Organization in shaping 
domestic policies in areas such as finance, transport and infrastructure, health and labour,95 barely 
touched Ethiopia. The mandate apparatus engaged comprehensively, if fitfully, in “establishing … 
the underlying sociological structure and the political, social and economic substance of the 
juridical state,”96 and remained a common touchstone for those thinking about what the League 
might do in Ethiopia. Yet mandate-style oversight was inapposite for a polity recognized as an 
independent state and already accorded the status of League member. What was absent was any 
vision of international assistance relevant to Ethiopian conditions but distinct from something like 
the imposition of a mandate, or a logic of indirect rule under international advisers.  
Left to his own devices, Ras Tafari was increasingly able to pursue locally inflected modernization 
initiatives (particularly following the death of the conservative Minister for War in 1926, and Ras 
Tafari’s coronation as Haile Sellassie in 1930). His reforms mingled personal vision, Japanese and 
other foreign precedents with gradual bureaucratic and interpersonal experimentation: a form of 
statecraft which addressed questions like slavery in a wider matrix of relations between centre and 
provinces, educated bureaucrats and ancient families.97 Ras Tafari sketched the juridical lines of 
a centralized polity in Ethiopia’s first written constitution, promulgated in 1931. Inspired by 
English, American, German, Italian and particularly Japanese sources,98 the text included a brief 
catalogue of liberal rights, but was primarily concerned with establishing Haile Sellassie’s lineage 
and dynastic transmission, and furthering centralization.99 Crucially, the constitution contained no 
express reservation of the powers of provincial governors, holding these positions open for the 
Emperor’s appointment. Haile Sellassie continued efforts to place the educated élite in positions 
of importance (overseeing the railway, presiding over the special court adjudicating cases 
involving foreign nationals; customs posts, envoys).100 However, the ministers still tended to be 
dominated by old families. Haile Sellassie seems often to have tried to sow change from within, 																																																								
95 See, eg, the increasingly sophisticated “technical assistance” offered by the International Labour Office 
to governments on labour and welfare issues, and, through the 1930s, to peripheral polities engaged in 
modernization projects: Guy Fiti Sinclair, To Reform the World: International Organizations and the 
Making of Modern States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 29–110. 
96 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 148. 
97 For a narrative that focuses on Ethiopia’s own initiatives on slavery, Christine Whyte, “‘Everyone 
Knows That Laws Bring the Greatest Benefits to Mankind’: The Global and Local Origins of Anti-
Slavery in Abyssinia, 1880–1942,” Slavery & Abolition 35, no. 4 (2014): 657–61. 
98 Marcus, Haile Sellassie I, 116. On inspiration from the Meiji Constitution, see J Calvitt III Clarke, 
Alliance of the Colored Peoples. Ethiopia & Japan before World War II (Woodbridge: James Currey, 
2011), 37–38, 172–73. 
99 Tekle Hawariat, as quoted in John Markakis, Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1974), 273; Zewde, Pioneers, 182.  
100 Zewde, Pioneers, 179–81. 
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allowing older families to hold the ministry itself but appointing an educated reformer as Director, 
or executive, immediately beneath the minister, or at the somewhat lower rank of Secretary or 
Secretary-General.101 This offered some prospect of advancing reforms but could also lead, in 
cases of ministerial resistance, to “the dislocation of the whole administrative machinery.”102 
In 1932–33 Haile Sellassie succeeded in breaking the special prerogatives of two of the more 
independent provincial chiefs.103 He identified a number of “model provinces” ripe for reform, 
and gave the governorship to trusted collaborators, like Tekle Hawariat (a Russian-educated 
protégé of Ras Makonnen, Ras Tafari’s father), and Workneh Eshaté (anglicized as Dr Charles 
Martin; an Ethiopian taken as a child from the battlefield during Britain’s 1868 punitive expedition 
against Emperor Tewodros, and educated in India). Haile Selassie also experimented with 
appointing advisers directly to the provincial government, nominating Colonel Sandford (of long 
residence in Ethiopia, and working both for his own commercial interests and occasionally for the 
British government) in Maji.104 These figures themselves seem to have sought some guidance 
from colonial models,105 but in the context of what they understood as a complex interplay 
between central and provincial authority, reformist and traditional mores. The provincial 
reorganisation unfolded under the personal control of Haile Sellassie, through his “Ministry of the 
Pen” (a sort of chancellery), reflecting a tension like that with ministerial reform, whereby 
centralization was achieved by the personalization of rule. This was not uncontested. Tekle 
Hawariat occasionally resisted Haile Sellassie’s personalization of authority. 106  There were 
tensions too between Ethiopian educated élites and foreign advisers, as the former resented the 
greater influence and pay offered to foreigners,107 and in the 1930s Haile Sellassie began censoring 
views expressed by some reformists in the newspaper he himself had established.108 
																																																								
101 Ibid., 176–78. 
102 Report by Mr de Halpert on his Period of Service with the Ethiopian Government, 22 May 1934, encl 
with Barton to Simon, 18 Jun 1934, FO CP 14809, No 36(i), 77, 81–82. Halpert, a British adviser to the 
Ministry of the Interior, had proposed a bundle of reforms to provincial administration. He faced 
opposition from the Minister of the Interior, and a succession of Directors, immediately under the 
Minister, were also opposed or, where committed, blocked by the Minister. Halpert resigned in frustration 
in 1934. 
103 Marcus, Haile Sellassie I, 119–124. 
104 The ideas Sandford had sketched in 1921 disclaimed mandatory ambitions, but the whole conception 
was grounded ultimately in Britain being able to “bring [Ras Tafari] quickly to heel”: see above n 51. 
105 On Dr Martin’s use of techniques he developed in the Indian Civil Service, Peter P Garretson, A 
Victorian Gentleman & Ethiopian Nationalist: The Life & Times of Hakim Wärkenäh, Dr. Charles Martin 
(Suffolk: James Currey, 2012), 173–196. On Sandford, in Maji, seeking advice from British officials in 
the Tanganyika mandate,  Eleanor Casbon, The Incurable Optimists. Chris and Dan Sandford of Ethiopia 
(Cornwall: United Writers, 1993), 98. 
106 Zewde, Pioneers, 169–70. 
107 Ibid., 174–75, 196–97. 
108 Ibid., 193. 
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Comparison of the complex initiatives undertaken by Ras Tafari and others with the relatively 
undeveloped proposals for assistance under League auspices illustrates the limits of international 
expertise and imagination concerning how states might be fashioned to function in a universal 
international order. The limits of the League’s ability to advance reform in Ethiopia were clearest 
in connection with slavery, the one area in which the League had been anticipated to act most 
boldly. Ethiopia always featured prominently in the fact-finding efforts of the League’s 
“Temporary Commission on Slavery” (1924–25) and its successor bodies,109  but the League did 
not progress to intervention of the kind that many anti-slavery groups had envisaged in 1919.  
To some extent, the lack of action through League bodies was due to inter-imperial rivalries, which 
Ras Tafari played to his advantage. The French government, in keeping with its support for 
Ethiopia within the League, largely shielded Ethiopia from criticism. The Italian expert, too, 
showed little interest in slavery before the 1930s. The British position was more varied, torn 
between a desire on the part of government officials and “experts” like Lugard to see change, both 
in the interests of adjacent British territories and their own sense of humanitarian mission, and an 
inclination to use the threat of criticism as a bargaining chip against Ethiopia in the service of other 
imperial agendas.  
Yet the lack of action was also a reflection of the limited expertise which the League, or anti-
slavery bodies, could actually offer. While proposals for action under League auspices showed 
some grasp of the interconnectedness of slavery and the slave trade with the local economy, and 
centre-province relations, there was little sense of how to go about addressing these 
interconnections. Matters came to a head with a resurgence of attention to slavery, the creation 
(under US pressure) of a special Commission to investigate forced labour in Liberia, and 
appointment in 1931 (after British pressure) of a new League “Committee of Experts on Slavery” 
(CES). Alarmed by the Liberian precedent, Haile Sellassie asked the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines 
Protection Society (one of the leading anti-slavery organizations) to send a mission to advise him. 
This could have been a vehicle for the behind-the-scenes assistance the FO had sometimes 
contemplated (particularly on funds to free slaves, and means of occupying them after release). 
But the ASAPS ended up sending Lord Noel-Buxton, a longstanding anti-slavery campaigner but 
someone lacking detailed knowledge of Ethiopia, and unlikely to have practical insights. On Noel-
Buxton’s visit in 1932, Haile Sellassie agreed to proposals for slavery judges, police and 
enforcement. However, Noel-Buxton prioritised a humanitarian agenda aimed at internationalist 
audiences, submitting his report to the League without first showing it to Haile Sellassie, and 
mentioning in the Times the prospect of a League mandate over Ethiopia. Sandford, then an adviser 
to Haile Sellassie, reported with frustration that this was hindering real progress on the ground.110  
In the CES, Lugard used the Noel-Buxton report to press again for a League adviser and perhaps 
League funding. This time, the Italian expert, too, eagerly embraced the opportunity to depict 																																																								
109 On the work of these bodies, Miers, Slavery in the Twentieth Century, 100–133, 174–179, 197–316. 
110 Ibid., 177–79 
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Ethiopia as hopelessly backward.111 The usual support from the French expert, who argued for 
Ethiopia’s right to comment on the report and evidence, and reports from the British adviser to the 
Ministry of the Interior detailing reforms, held back more comprehensive inquiries.112 But it is not 
clear that these inquiries could have produced any more nuanced program of reform than those 
being developed iteratively in the “model provinces.”  
The fact that the League’s engagement with Ethiopia, even on slavery, turned out to be rather 
limited, is not to downplay the relations of power inherent in the perpetual possibility of more 
decisive League action. But the limits of the actual expertise on offer through the League does 
reflect again the ambivalence of notions of statehood evident at the moment of Ethiopia’s 
admission. In moving from imperialism to quasi-universal international organization as the basic 
structure of the international legal order, there was a critical evasion of the question of how to 
bring states into being. Neither the parsimonious and somewhat artificial criteria for admission, 
nor the more fine-grained institutional dealings with polities once admitted, grappled with the 
relation between juridical status as states and League members, reform on specific questions such 
as slavery, and the larger structural issues of centre-periphery relations, and extension of effective 
control, with which Ras Tafari was preoccupied. 
As geopolitical circumstances shifted in the 1930s, Ethiopia’s status as a League member came 
under pressure. As Parfitt has argued, the developments of the 1930s are not so much a 
contradiction of Ethiopian admission as an exploitation of the ambivalences involved in the 
admission process, which reformulated rather than transcended Ethiopia’s precarity.113 However, 
admission had nevertheless entailed certain protections. Relative to its stated ideals, and the 
protections to which Ethiopia was formally entitled, the League failed utterly, but relative to a 
position in which Ethiopia was not a member at all, the League offered juridical and institutional 
avenues for the preservation of statehood. 
After Italy drew Ethiopia into a border incident near the un-demarcated boundary between Ethiopia 
and Italian Somaliland, the dispute was channelled first into an arbitration that ultimately found 
neither party responsible. A “Committee of Five” drawn from the Council proposed a “Charter of 
Assistance” to Ethiopia which combined the recurring recourse to mandate-like structures with 
outright “colonial appeasement.”114 Even this was rejected by Italy. A Committee of Thirteen (ie 
all Council members, except Italy) then prepared a report on the situation, but Anglo-French 																																																								
111 Ribi Forclaz, Humanitarian Imperialism, 143ff. 
112 Miers, Slavery in the Twentieth Century, 201–2. 
113 Parfitt, “Empire des Nègres blancs.” 
114 On colonial appeasement, see Pedersen, The Guardians, 325–354. For the “Charter of Assistance,” see 
Report by Committee of Five to the Council, 24 Sep 1935, C.379.M.191.1935.VII in LNOJ 16 (1935): 
1620. The Charter amounted in effect to a complete takeover of sovereign functions by foreign 
specialists. It was only minimally a “League” initiative: advisers were to be overseen by a delegate of the 
League accredited to the Emperor, but the three European powers would be heavily involved, and Italy 
would have special recognition of economic interests as against Britain and France. 
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imperatives to placate Italy undermined the sanctions regime and the League failed to give effect 
to the guarantee of territorial integrity in art 10 of the Covenant.  
These exchanges offer a retrospective lens on how the parties understood the significance of 
admission in rearticulating Ethiopia’s status. Just prior to invasion, the Italian Government 
submitted a long memorandum to the Council which cast Ethiopia as the negative of a legitimate 
state: a treaty-breaker, a slave state, indeed not a state at all, but rather a failed and exploitative 
colonial administration by a small “Abyssinian” polity of much larger, and very distinct, 
populations.115 The memorandum combined a focus on treaty compliance, and Ethiopia’s failure 
to adhere to its “special obligations” (criteria which had been discussed on admission) with general 
complaints about a lack of internal order (something not central to the admissions criteria, but a 
preoccupation of the delegations in 1923), and general language about civilization and barbarism 
in the treatment of prisoners and the ill. The Committee of Five’s proposed “Charter of Assistance” 
had defaulted to an imperialistic model of intervention which implicitly accepted critiques of this 
nature. Yet once the Charter of Assistance was rejected by Italy, and the Committee of Thirteen 
had to consider the Italian memorandum, it defended Ethiopia’s position by invoking precisely the 
status granted “on credit” in 1923.  
Where Italy complained that Ethiopia had not respected the special obligations attached to its 
admission, the Committee read these special obligations as reserving an exclusive role for the 
Council to make recommendations as to their observance. The fact that there had been no proposal 
for the Council to do so became a means of undermining Italy’s unilateral critiques.116 As for 
border raids, the Committee of Thirteen pointed to the “great difficulty of ensuring the application 
by the subordinate provincial authorities if the policy of the Central Government.” The lack of 
control over territory thus figured as a means of defending Ethiopian status, not attacking it. And 
insofar as Italy tried to use this internal disorder as a complaint in its own right, the report implicitly 
suggested that Ethiopia was not to be held to standards applicable elsewhere: 
the Governments which, in 1923, supported Ethiopia’s request for admission … were 
aware of the internal situation of the Empire at that time … those Governments considered 
that the entry of Ethiopia into the League would not only afford her a further guarantee for 
the maintenance of her territorial integrity and independence, but would help her to reach 
a higher level of civilisation. There does not appear to be more disorder and insecurity in 
Ethiopia to-day than was the case in 1923.117  
In other words, Ethiopian admission had been granted on a basis which may have diverged from 
that prevailing in other states; but that admission created rights which could not be contested by 
invocation of more general criteria of “stateness” or “civilization.” The Council was willing to 																																																								
115 LNOJ 16 (1935): 1355ff.  
116 Ibid., 1616. 
117 Ibid., 1605, 1618. Part of this statement was quoted by Haile Sellassie in his 1936 speech to the 
Assembly: see LNOJSS 151 (1936): 23. 
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contemplate subjecting Ethiopia to a regime of quasi-colonial rule under nominal League auspices, 
but not to contemplate an unmaking of the state altogether on Italian demands.  
In procedural terms, the League gave Ethiopia some minimal claim to be heard. The Ethiopian 
delegation filed responses to the Italian memorandum, refuting its accuracy, pointing out that any 
lack of control on the empire’s fringes was not dissimilar to patterns seen in European empires, 
and seeking an international commission of inquiry to ascertain the true position. The impact of 
these representations was limited to a large extent by the great powers’ influence in shaping League 
procedure, and the outlook of the Secretariat. The then-Secretary-General, Joseph Avenol, and 
Secretariat staff, helped curb the publicity of discussion and avoid open confrontation with Italy.118 
This steered discussions into and out of certain League fora, dissuaded recourse to the Assembly, 
and postponed League discussions in order to accommodate ad hoc negotiations.119 Secretariat 
decisions amplified Italian positions and marginalized Ethiopian ones. Excuses were found, for 
example, not to circulate a letter from Dr Martin, then the Ethiopian Minister in London, 
mentioning the torture of an Italian political prisoner and contending that “the Fascist form of 
Government is by no means suitable for Colonial administration, and that people living in glass 
houses are ill-advised to throw stones.”120 Council members did not publicize what they knew of 
Italian gas attacks in Ethiopia,121 and correspondence to the Secretariat registering British liberal 
opposition to the invasion was carefully managed.122 Yet efforts to bar Ethiopian access to the 
Assembly and Council by ruling their credentials invalid did not succeed.123 Haile Sellassie’s 
personal appeal to the League Assembly in 1936 helped build powerful popular support in Britain 
and the US for the Ethiopian cause, despite the stance taken by the British government. Thus, 
regardless of the micromanagement of particular statements by the Secretariat, and the limits on 
Ethiopian ability to make full use of the League machinery, the narratives for which the League 
provided a formal stage may have helped preserve the Ethiopian state as an international actor, 
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strengthening claims for independence after WWII, and contributing to a draining of persuasive 
force from old languages of European trusteeship.124 
VI. The interwar episode in twentieth-century chronologies of statehood and state-making 
The Italian invasion was a violent caesura in state-making within Ethiopia itself. It drove Haile 
Sellassie into exile in Britain, dissolved solidarities between leading reformists, and saw the 
systematic slaughter in 1937 of intellectual élites who might otherwise have been in the vanguard 
of the Ethiopian bureaucracy.125 Despite the violence and disruption of the Italian occupation, 
however, there were continuities in both the juridical status of Ethiopia, and the concrete practices 
of state-making, spanning WWII. In the abstract retrospection of international law, Ethiopian 
statehood never actually disappeared.126 Britain, France and many other states had recognized 
Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia by 1938, but this recognition was withdrawn by Britain in 
November 1940, and the British government declared in 1941 that it would welcome the re-
emergence of an independent Ethiopia under Haile Sellassie. After the defeat of Italian forces in 
Ethiopia, authority was exercised by an unstable combination of of the emperor, the British 
military forces, and the (British) Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (OETA). 127  An 
Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1942 recognized that Ethiopia was “free and independent,” albeit 
subject to British oversight in crucial matters (“for all practical purposes a British protectorate”).128 
With the prospect of US support, and the appointment of what would be a longstanding American 
legal adviser, John Spencer, to the foreign ministry, Haile Sellassie was able to secure a less over-
bearing Anglo-Ethiopian treaty in 1944.129 In keeping with the theory that the Ethiopian state had 
persisted despite the temporary destruction of all independent government, Ethiopia took its seat 
in the UN as of right, as a founding member. 
On the ground, state-making activities after WWII followed many of the patterns seen in the 
interwar years. Several individuals who had served as advisers in the 1930s played a role in the 
																																																								
124 Pedersen, The Guardians, 297–98; Ribi Forclaz, Humanitarian Imperialism, 190–91; on African-
American and black Caribbean mobilization, Joseph E Harris, African-American Reactions to War in 
Ethiopia 1936–1941 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994), 34–84; Shilliam, 
“Intervention and Colonial-Modernity,” 1144–46. 
125 Bahru Zewde, “The Ethiopian Intelligentsia and the Italo-Ethiopian War 1935–1941,” International 
Journal of African Historical Studies 26 (1993): 271. 
126 James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, 2nd ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), 
519–20, 702–3. 
127 John H. Spencer, Ethiopia at Bay: A Personal Account of the Haile Selassie Years (Algonac: 
Reference Publications, Inc, 1984), 95. Spencer served as legal adviser to the Ethiopian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
128 Ibid., 99. 
129 Ibid., 140–45. 
Forthcoming in (2019) 10 Humanity 
	 30 
wartime administration and beyond.130 Tendencies towards centralization and absolutism, central 
elements of Haile Sellassie’s interwar efforts, were crystallized in the 1955 Constitution;131 indeed 
British involvement advanced centralization by marginalising Ethiopian republicans in exile in 
Sudan, who favoured popular rule and federalism rather than centralized monarchy.132  
One can also see important continuities between the way in which the League’s admissions criteria 
crystallized and framed questions of legal status, and the way such questions were approached in 
the UN. Under the UN Charter, the test for admission of states after the founding of the UN was, 
as in the League, relatively minimalist. The UN was, under art 4(1), “open to all … peace-loving 
states” (“state” then being roughly as defined in the Montevideo Convention),133 which accept 
Charter obligations, and, in the judgment of the UN, are “able and willing” to meet them. 
Admission of new members operated much as it had under the League, effectively driving 
(although not superseding in a juridical sense) bilateral recognition, and admission would come to 
be considered conclusive of the fact of statehood.134 The institutional context of decision-making 
about admission remained important, although the Charter’s reference to Security Council 
recommendation gave the major powers an effective veto over membership which the League 
Council had not enjoyed. As in the League, practice moved rapidly away from literal application 
of even the minimalist art 4(1) criteria, towards an aspiration to universality. The question of 
whether an applicant was a “state” remained important, but deliberations tended to turn on doubts 
about the plausibility of territorial claims, and whether polities were genuinely independent, rather 
than features of their internal government. This meant that, by the time the wave of decolonization 
accelerated, a precedent had already been set for avoiding any searching inquiry into whether these 
newly independent states satisfied art 4(1).135  
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Despite superficial continuities in the minimalist definition of statehood, however, the Charter 
order implied major changes to how statehood functioned within a larger international legal order. 
The greater emphasis on individual rights relative to the 1920s legitimated a certain international 
scrutiny of, and concern with, the internal government of states which had been bounded under 
the League by specific regimes, like that for minorities. The international order increasingly also 
articulated grounds for looking inside empire-states, as “self-determination” was given new force 
and legal articulation. With decolonization, there was a further entrenchment and 
operationalization of the link seen already in the League era, between an expansive approach to 
admission criteria, on one hand, and far-reaching possibilities of international oversight. After 
WWII, international organizations like the UN became more sophisticated and intrusive vectors 
of expertise in “development” and later “governance,” and supported or even led the sorts of “state-
making” projects which Haile Sellassie had pursued in the interwar period. In situations of conflict 
or crisis, dispute settlement, peacekeeping and “transitional justice” processes came to address 
acute questions about the locus of political authority. 136  Often mediated by international 
institutions, if still dominated by major powers,137 such processes linked status in international 
law, and admission to international organizations, with the reformulation of internal constitutional 
and political arrangements. If the definition of statehood as such remained thin, functional, and 
loosely applied, the task of, and expertise in, state-making spread itself through new institutional 
and disciplinary sites.  
These patterns are reflected in the Horn of Africa, as elsewhere. Having earlier espoused an 
understanding of Ethiopia as an empire, Haile Sellassie argued after WWII for narrow definitions 
of colonialism and non-self-governing territories, as those geographically separate from the 
metropole. This effort insulated Ethiopia from some of the fissiparous pressures of self-
determination and decolonization (but not ongoing tensions with Eritrea and peoples in the south). 
However, the surrounding colonies each had troubled passages into statehood, with “self-
determination” a recurrent argument, if not solution,138 and Ethiopia’s own current constitution 
now incorporates self-determination for “nations, nationalities and peoples” through sub-federal 
states.139 The Horn of Africa has also seen a pattern of international involvement in maintaining 
statehood through the UN and other international and regional bodies, in everything from the 
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unusual “federation” between Ethiopia and Eritrea brokered by the UN,140 to various peacekeeping 
missions, and extensive international involvement in shepherding into existence the Republic of 
South Sudan.  
Although the post-1945 history of the Horn of Africa is highly complex, the Ethiopian trajectory 
can, I argue, prompt us to look again at dominant narratives about the changing nature of statehood 
over the twentieth century. One such narrative suggests that post-WWII decolonization broke 
fundamentally with pre-WWII emphasis on effectiveness for statehood and recognition. On this 
account, decolonization gave rise to states “‘posited’ by international society,” the continued 
existence of which depended on the “normative, legal, and organizational superstructure” of 
international law and the UN.141 These accounts are open to criticism in multiple grounds, but 
Ethiopia, often erroneously listed among the “quasi-states” or “failing states” emerging from 
decolonization,142 presents a particular chronological and analytical challenge.  
If Ethiopia does share certain common traits with surrounding decolonized polities, many of these 
traits turn out to be intimately related to questions about internal structures within Ethiopia which 
were raised, if only tentatively, in the 1920s. The ambiguities of self-determination in multi-ethnic 
polities, and the fragility of political order within arbitrary boundaries, are familiar artefacts of 
decolonization, but they are also merely continuations of Ethiopia’s longstanding difficulties in 
centre-periphery relations, and in building a machinery of state capable of functioning in the 
distinct conditions of that polity. If there is a disjuncture between effectiveness of authority and 
formal status in the twentieth-century international legal order, its origins long predate 1945, and 
are particularly apparent in the interwar period.  
As sketched here, criteria for membership of the League, and the questionnaire developed to 
implement them, saw a shift away from nineteenth-century understandings of a loose “standard of 
civilization.” This shift involved an imperfect effort to bracket religious, cultural or racial 
dimensions of status, but also, more significantly for my purposes, a turning away from explicit 
consideration of internal political structures and governmental capacity at exactly the moment 
when the creation of a new international organisation seemed to demand greater emphasis on these 
matters. One response to the unease about whether, and how, Ethiopia satisfied the criteria for 
membership was to recast membership as a process of reform, possibly overseen by the League 																																																								
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(or European empires operating through the League), rather than as recognition of a status already 
achieved. In the interwar period, the substantive content of international oversight in nominally 
independent states had not been found. The League as such had offered limited independent 
expertise, that of colonial administrators: a sort of indirect rule that was too static for what Ras 
Tafari was trying to accomplish. Seen in this light, Ethiopia is not a “failed state” avant la lettre, 
but a marker of where a certain effort to think through the nature of the state—under conditions of 
international organization—failed first, opening questions which remain pressing today. 
